Nomad crypto bridge looted. BlackCat ransomware hits energy company. DSIRF disputes Microsoft’s report. Wartime disinformation.

In this issue

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Summary

At a glance.

  • Nomad cryptocurrency bridge looted.
  • BlackCat ransomware gang hits European energy company.
  • DSIRF disputes Microsoft’s cyber mercenary report.
  • Atrocities and disinformation.
  • Domestic disinformation in Russia?

Nomad cryptocurrency bridge looted.

Bloomberg reports that Nomad, which provides a bridge over which crypto tokens may be shifted to different blockchains, was hit yesterday by an attack that’s caused the loss of nearly $200 million in cryptocurrency. PeckShield, which has been following developments over its Twitter account, is credited with noticing the caper. Researcher samczsun describes how the theft was carried out. “It all started when @officer_cia shared @spreekaway‘s tweet in the ETHSecurity Telegram channel. Although I had no idea what was going on at the time, just the sheer volume of assets leaving the bridge was clearly a bad sign.” Apparently there was a flaw in the platform’s blockchain contract that allowed users to withdraw more than they’d deposited. After the initial exploit, around forty other copycat attacks followed. We heard from Comparitech’s Head of Data Research, Rebecca Moody, who ranked this attack as the ninth largest of this kind. “Overnight, Nomad Bridge was drained for over $190 million in the third-biggest crypto heist of 2022 and the ninth-biggest of all time, according to Comparitech’s worldwide cryptocurrency heist tracker,” she said. “But in a unique twist, the hack on Nomad appeared to be carried out by numerous copy-and-paste actors. Experts suggest that the initial hacker found a fatal flaw in the platform’s Replica contract, meaning anyone (including those with zero coding knowledge) could locate a transaction that worked, use their address to replace the user’s address, and re-broadcast it. Over the space of a few hours, almost all of the bridge’s $190.7 million was drained with just $651.54 left.” It’s unclear how much, if any, of the currency lost will be recovered. Moody says, “There are suggestions that white hat hackers removed some of the funds to safeguard them, but it remains to be seen just how much of the $190 million is recoverable.”

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BlackCat ransomware gang hits Luxembourgeois energy company.

The BlackCat ransomware privateers, also known as ALPHV and generally regarded as a DarkSide successor (or simply as DarkSide rebranded) claimed responsibility for an attack on Creos, a Luxembourg company that operates a major Western European gas pipeline, BleepingComputer reports. According to the Record, “The group claims to have stolen 150 GB of data that they said includes contracts, passports, bills and emails. They threatened to leak the data on Monday but as of the afternoon, no data had been released.” Creos’s corporate parent, Encevo, said late last week that it was continuing to investigate the incident, which has affected its customer-facing portals. Like its immediate ancestor DarkSide (responsible for last year’s cyberattack against Colonial Pipeline), BlackCat is based in Russia and has shown an interest in targeting Western energy infrastructure.

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DSIRF disputes Microsoft’s characterization of the Austrian firm as cyber mercenaries.

Reuters quotes a statement by the Austrian firm DSIRF, whom Microsoft had described as cyber mercenaries selling Subzero spyware to customers who abused it. “Subzero is a software of the Austrian DSIRF GesmbH, which has been developed exclusively for official use in states of the EU. It is neither offered, sold nor made available for commercial use,” DSIRF said in an emailed statement. “In view of the facts described by Microsoft, DSIRF resolutely rejects the impression that it has misused Subzero software.” Reuters says it’s not clear who DSIRF’s legitimate European Union customers are. Microsoft identified DSIRF as the threat group it tracked as Knotweed.

HIMARS, atrocity, provocation, and disinformation.

More HIMARS ammunition is on its way from the US to Ukraine, and, according to Defense News, Congress would like to see the US Administration increase even those supplies. The US-supplied HIMARS rockets continue to disturb Russian operations, and Russian planning and policy. The Telegraph reports that Russia’s Defense Ministry has said that HIMARS employment makes the US a direct participant in the war. Misreporting an interview with a senior Ukrainian officer, the Defense Ministry said the US was providing precise, timely targeting information to the Ukrainian batteries. “This is the ultimate proof that Washington, despite the White House and the Pentagon’s claims, is directly involved in the conflict in Ukraine,” a Kremlin spokesman said.

The killing of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Olenivka is by now clearly a Russian atrocity--the prisoners were apparently murdered by their captors. (And we note in passing that the International Committee of the Red Cross still has not been given the access to the prison international law requires.) The prisoners did not die in a Ukrainian HIMARS strike, as Russia claimed. Politico summarizes the conclusion of US officials who investigated the incident: there’s no evidence of a HIMARS strike. Different weapons leave different signatures and debris behind, and these can often decisively identify what weapon was used.

Too ridiculous to rebut, but still, you can see they like the idea.

Some recent disinformation--a Russian front group that poses as an independent new service has reported that President Putin’s inner circle, especially its GRU representatives, are secretly working for Bellingcat--suggests a sinister internal audience. “The idea that @bellingcat, of all organizations, would have spies breathing in Putin’s neck and at the top of the GRU, feeding him disinfo and passing personal secrets to us, as flattering as it is, is so ridiculous it doesn’t even warrant a serious rebuttal.” Of course, Bellingcat would say that. The claim that Bellingcat has compromised the GRU comes from SouthFront, an English-language news service and Russian government front organization. The teaser for SouthFront’s video report reads in part, “Independent journalist Dilyana Gaytandzhieva [founder of ArmsWatch and a SouthFront correspondent] appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin. She says that the Putin’s elite inner circle [sic] is infiltrated by NATO informants. She asked for a meeting with Ramzan Kadyrov [boss of Chechnya, and one of Mr. Putin’s more intemperate and brutal political allies] to give him a list of names of identified infiltrated GRU agents.” Ms Gaytandzhieva said, in her video, “According to my source, Ramzan Kadyrov is the only person in your circle who can be trusted.”

Why SouthFront would take pains to single out the GRU is an interesting question. It may indicate that a purge of the GRU is in the offing. SouthFront is believed to operate from Crimea, and is probably run by the FSB. It’s been on the US Treasury Department’s list of sanctioned entities since April of 2021. Its singling out of the GRU as a source of leaks, deception, and disinformation seems significant. The FSB may be preparing the ground for a purge of its sister (and rival) service. If this proves to be so, the purge would be another throwback to the 1930s, when Stalin used the GRU and the FSB’s predecessors to keep one another in check.

The CyberWire’s continuing coverage of the unfolding crisis in Ukraine may be found here.

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