6-minute read | 950 words
Subscribe to the newsletter to receive this issue in your inbox every Sunday.
Navigating the GPS threat landscape, with Brandon Karpf.
Host Maria Varmazis, Dave Bittner, and Brandon Karpf discuss how GPS attacks are evolving. They use recent research that found a series of GPS disruptions dating back several years that examines how unlike traditional jamming attacks, these disruptions occurred in space rather than on the ground, potentially dramatically changing the attack surface for GPS constellations.
Subscribe and listen to the conversation now.
The next era of GPS attacks.
This week on T-Minus: Space-Cyber Briefing: we look at how GPS attacks are evolving. Whereas traditional GPS jamming and spoofing attacks have typically involved targeting weak signals as they reach the surface, new attacks are potentially targeting these signals in space.
Does this newsletter spark questions for you? Write to us at space@n2k.com to guide how we’ll continue to explore how GPS attacks are continuing to evolve in future podcast episodes and newsletter issues.
Evolving GPS attacks.
Traditionally, GPS attacks try to target signals as they reach the ground, taking advantage of their weak strengths by launching spoofing or jamming attacks. As these GPS technologies have only become more important for modern societies, these on-the-ground attacks have only become more commonplace. Of increasing concern is the growing evidence that demonstrates that these attacks could evolve to target these signals while still in space.
According to recent research, attackers could be targeting GPS signals in space. In these findings, researchers observed a series of odd incidents taking place over several years where GPS signals were being disrupted before reaching the ground, with each disruption occurring between Tuesday to Thursday during European business hours.
After substantial investigations, researchers were able to trace these disruption efforts to a specific satellite, Kosmos 2546, a satellite that makes up Russia’s Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema, the nation’s missile launch detection constellation.
While researchers are confident that these disruptions were intentional, it is unclear what the intent is. Todd Humpherys, the University of Austin Texas professor who discovered the disruptions, speculated that the outages could be a part of a series of operational GPS interference tests. Humphreys emphasized how these tests could be precursors to eventual hot zone deployments.
While the attack theory is plausible, other researchers have provided an alternative explanation. Richard Bowden, the division head of assured and resilient positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) at GMV, noted that conducting so many tests would be odd if it was a weapon. Rather, Bowden argued that these jamming signals could be short communication messages using GPS signals as a security cover, as few nations would ever benefit from attempting to degrade these services.
Regardless of motivation or intent, the incidents demonstrate that GPS signals are not only vulnerable on the ground but in space, expanding the attack surface for one of the world’s most critical technologies. As a result, governments are increasingly reassessing how they secure and provide PNT services.
A new attack surface.
For decades, discussions surrounding GPS security have largely focused on terrestrial threats. From airport disruptions to maritime spoofing campaigns and battlefield jamming, most GPS attacks have occurred after signals have traveled from orbit to Earth by making them significantly weaker.
Humpherys’s research suggests that this established norm could be changing. If these disruptions were intentional, they demonstrate a significant advancement in space cyberattacks. Now, attackers would be able to target and manipulate signals before they ever reached the endpoint device.
Given these emerging threats and the proliferation of terrestrial GPS attacks, governments are already working to create redundant PNT capabilities. In 2025, France and the United Kingdom signed a cross-channel pact to combat these concerns. One of the key technologies being considered are enhanced long-range navigation (eLoran), a terrestrial-based system that uses specialized radio towers that are significantly harder to block.
Alongside resilient radio waves, the US Navy and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began conducting tests in 2016 to assess if fiber networks could serve as a backup to GPS. In their initial experiments, the Navy and NIST suggested that fiber could be used as a partial backup, with GPS still being used to correct timing delays, or fiber could be used as an even more reliable backup option if two independent telecommunications network paths were used.
Regardless, the discovery of these disruptions and the growing investment in alternative PNT capabilities underscore an important reality. GPS threats are evolving. As interference extends into orbit, future resilience measures will need to account for a much larger threat landscape, one that stretches from terrestrial receivers all the way to the satellites themselves.
This week’s space-cyber headlines.
The news stories we’re reading and thinking about this week.
DHS S&T highlights new SPARTA Resources for defending spacecraft against cyberattacks.
- DHS S&T are supporting new additions to the Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) framework to help satellite operators and developers better detect, prioritize, and defend against cyber threats.
- The two tools include a new set of behavioral threat indicators alongside a new countermeasure prioritization methodology.
- Listen to Maria’s coverage of this story on CyberWire Daily.
June 12, 2026 | Source: Executive Gov
Europe’s Iris2 constellation adds 66 early-delivery satellites, to launch in 2029.
- Iris2 multi-orbit secured connectivity network is now adding 66 new smaller satellites to its low-Earth-orbit component and are set to launch in 2029.
- Iris2’s full-capacity of 264-satellites will be launched around 2032.
June 15, 2026 | Source: Space Intel Report
